---

幫巴哈的朋友回到Ptt上：

http://m.gamer.com.tw/home/creationDetail.php?sn=3167807


.....=_=......

那只是我前幾天拍照上傳了一些我看到覺得很勁爆的解密檔案而已.....

完全沒想到會整個.....這麼....「熱烈」

用手機看臉書都還看到有人分享那篇......那甚至不是我正在寫的相關長篇文章，也不是
一個完成品，就只是放出一點資料









那位轉貼去PTT的先生好像忘了轉貼我後半段關於"當年的"中華民國1945年後在台灣做的
「好事」導致1950年代的貧窮和飢荒、中華民國不具台灣主權的證據等部分......比如這
兩段↓





真正導致台灣從戰前亞洲先進之列 (要質疑來源的話這是美國人說的喔，
以及台灣學界最近也靠攏向這派) ，倒成1950年代的貧困事實上是中國民國在台灣的
劫掠壓榨，比如大量拆卸工廠物資設備去上海變賣導致大量企業消失

(1930年代後台灣是日本前進南洋的「工業重鎮」，如李國鼎1951年任職的台船公司就是
掠奪自日治時期的台灣船渠株式會社，請注意這是歷史課本說不存在於當年台灣的
「重工業」)、掠奪所有民營企業也就是公營企業和黨營企業來源，排擠台灣人就業，
因為只給「中國難民」任職，沒看過甘蔗的中國人可以直接當糖廠廠長等，

這對當時台灣經濟是毀滅性的；台灣二二八之前的史上最嚴重飢荒不是中華民國說的


中華民國的歷史跟北韓是一樣等級的，可能還超過。



書上的原文在這↓

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d402

[PPS 53]

United States Policy Toward Formosa and the Pescadores

美國國務院政策計劃處主任Kennan向國務卿提出的PPS53計畫書
《美國對台灣和澎湖政策》，這是要排除中華民國在台灣的統治

1. It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in
NSC 37/1,82 37/283 and 37/584 will attain our major objective with respect to
Formosa and the Pescadores—the denial of the islands to the Communists
through their separation from Chinese mainland control. The situation in
Formosa and the Pescadores is

超長的  我省略很多

[Washington,] July 6, 1949.

[Annex]

Draft Memorandum Prepared in Policy Planning Staff

[Washington,] June 23, 1949.

A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Pescadores

Preliminary Comment
1. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the
Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles: (a) there are now
approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such
action and (b) this Government is more or less committed to Chinese
sovereignty over the islands.




2. It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of denying
Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from
mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist
administrators from the islands and in the establishment of a provisional
international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of
self-determination for the islanders and would eventually, prior to a
Japanese peace settlement, conduct a plebiscite to determine the ultimate
disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only
concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.

3. There are two ways in which this change in regime could conceivably be
brought about.

a. One would be to induce other Far Eastern powers to take the lead
in initiating international action to achieve the above purpose. (For
purposes of illustration, I attach a paper outlining such a course of action,
drafted on the assumption that this was the course we would wish to pursue.)

b. The other would be to announce a temporary unilateral re-assertion
of authority over the islands on the grounds that subsequent events had
invalidated all the assumptions underlying the Cairo Declaration and that
U.S. intervention was required by the interests of stability in the Pacific
area as well as by the interests of the inhabitants of the islands.


2. This paper does not attempt to provide a solution to the first of these
obstacles. The answer to that question turns, in the last analysis, on
whether the National Military Establishment is able and willing, on much the
same principles which animated the British at Oran and Dakar, to provide the
requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist forces now
on the islands and to exert effective authority there for an interim period.
For these reasons, this plan cannot be implemented unless the NME indicates
such readiness and ability.

這份報告不對第一個障礙提供解答，那些答案根據最後的分析是 National Military
Establishment(國家軍事機構，意思是這樣，不知道台灣的正式翻譯做什麼)
能做且願意的。在這樣的原則


(發現真的太長了....看誰可以直接幫我翻譯吧)


3. This paper does explore the possibilities for overcoming the political
obstacles which stand in our way and for providing a justifiable political
framework within which this Government might resort to a show of force or, if
necessary, an active exercise of force in bringing about an administration
independent of Chinese mainland control and enjoying solid anti-Communist
popular support.

4. The recommendations which follow are suggestive rather than definitive.
The general course of action being proposed here is so complex and full of
unpredictable elements that, if accepted, it should be implemented with
intelligent flexibility.

Course of Action

5. An inquiry should be instituted, along the lines of paragraph 2 above, as
to whether the NME is able and willing to provide the requisite force to
subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist troops now on the islands,
and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. While awaiting
a reply from the NME, we should:

a. unofficially, through an existing cut-out, sound out the Philippine
Government in guarded terms slanted to its own interests regarding the
proposed course of action set forth in paragraph 8 (The Filipinos are
naturally going to be most reluctant to place themselves out in front on this
score unless this Government gives them a greater sense of security against
external attack.);
(非正式的，試探菲律賓政府在這方面(我的註解：移除在台的中國人政權)的意向)

b. in no-wise committing this Government, indirectly approach the
Australian Government along the same lines;

(試探澳大利亞政府同樣(我的註解：移除福爾摩沙的中國人政權)的事項)

c. even more cautiously and tentatively explore the attitude of the
Indian Government;(更小心且試探性的探究印度政府對此事的態度)

d. prepare a chapter in the White Paper on China dealing with Formosa,86
with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands since
VJ–Day (The White Paper, or at least the chapter on Formosa, should be
issued before action is taken along the lines laid down in paragraph 7.);

(在白皮書中增加福爾摩沙章節，強調中國人自從VJ-DAY後在島上的暴政)

e. release for background purposes a small but steady stream of
information of this character and information regarding the Formosan
reemancipation movement.
(公布「福爾摩沙人再解放聯盟」的資料作為討論背景)
(我的註解：第一個台獨建國團體)


6. If the reactions from all three Governments are negative, we should
reexamine this paper in the light of what has been learned.

7. If the reactions are affirmative and if the NME expresses a willingness to
make a show of force adequate to eliminate Nationalist troops from Formosa
and the Pescadores, and if necessary to apply it, we should forthwith

a. secretly and officially discuss with the Filipinos, Australians and,
if progress has been made with Nehru,87 the Indians, the questions which were
raised with them through informal contacts. We should state that if any one
or all of them would take the initiative in the matter we would be prepared
to support them and follow through on a practical basis. At this stage, the
British, Canadians and New Zealanders should be secretly advised of these
conversations;

b. If there is general concurrence among the Philippine, Australian and
Indian Governments that all or any one of them would raise the Formosan
question as an issue requiring the attention of the powers which defeated
Japan,＋ make our position clear along the lines set forth in the following
paragraph.

8. In our view the problem of Formosa and the Pescadores can be broken down
into two main components(福爾摩沙和澎湖問題可以被分解為兩個成分): (a) the

need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the
present period (在這時期需要一個穩固且負責的統治當局) while they are awaiting

a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese
peace settlement (當他們仍在等待中國局勢穩定以及最終處置的對日和約) , and (b)

the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to
their future(島民對自己未來的渴望必須被重視) so that a just and constructive

decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the
self-determination(民族自決) of the inhabitants of Formosa and the

Pescadores. We do not feel that we should take the initiative in seeking a
solution of these issues because (a) they are of more vital concern to the
Philippines and its neighbors than to us, (b) were we to do so, we would lay
ourselves open to charges of “Big Power intervention” and (c) our hands are
more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in
facilitating Chinese assmption of control over the islands. While we are most
reluctant to take the lead in this question, we will vigorously and fully
support those states which will take action along the following lines:

a. Notification to all other powers at war with Japan that: The notifying
states view with grave anxiety the mounting threat of chaos and civil strife
spreading from the mainland of China to Formosa and the Pescadores(通知所有和
日本作戰過的政權有關嚴重的焦慮，中國大陸的內戰和混亂正在被散布到福爾摩沙和澎湖
列島);

the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and
ravaged from those islands; the notifying powers cannot view without
misgivings this new jeopardization of the security of all Southeast Asia;
they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with
Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in
this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at
a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter,88 this
question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan.
The foregoing notification should be released for publication.

b. Either in the same notification or in a separate statement to be
issued simultaneously or shortly thereafter by all or any one of the
above-mentioned notifying governments, the proposal should be made that, in
view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores(福爾摩沙和
澎湖早期獨立的歷史),

of the shocking record of misrule during the past four
years by the Chinese (中國人過去四年來在島上令人震驚的的暴政紀錄) and of the
many pleas from repesentative Formosans for autonomy (以及許多典型的「福爾摩沙
人」的自治請求), the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the

U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite(公民投票) regarding the ultimate
disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of


It should be further proposed that the U.N. be requested in conducting the plebiscite to place the following
alternatives before the inhabitants of the islands:(聯合國應該進一步為島上住民
舉辦這些選項的「公民投票」)

(1) Do you wish to be administered by (a) whatever government emerges
on the mainland of China or (b) the present Chinese authorities on the
island, or(你希望被「無論」中國大陸出現什麼政府或現行島上的中國人政權統治，「
或」)

(2) Do you wish another form of administration: (a) trusteeship under
the United Nations, (b) independence, (c) any other?(你希望被另一個統治機構：
(a)聯合國託管 (b)獨立 (c) 任何其他？)



These proposals should likewise be made public.

9. The day following the notification recommended in paragraph 8, this
Government should:

a. propose to the concerned governments (and announce publicly) that
representatives of the states at war with Japan meet within one week’s time
at Manila or Canberra to act on the notification (Objections may be raised to
this proposal on the basis of inconvenience. Having made it, however, we can
then acquiesce to a conference of Ambassadors in Washington or London.);

b. announce publicly our reaction to the notification:

        (1) The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the
former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(台澎列島的最終處置必須等到對日和約簽訂)

        (2) Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military
administration because the United States Government enabled the Chinese
authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the
islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by
the President in the Cairo Declaration;(中國人在那裏是因為開羅宣言，所以美國讓
中國人去接受台澎列島的日軍投降)

        (3) Subsequent events in China and in Formosa have not justified the
assumptions on which these actions were taken: Chinese administration(中國統治
當局) on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive(貪婪的暴政) and the
chaos and strife(混亂和傷害) which wracked and gutted China Proper now
threaten to engulf these islands;


        (4) It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose
forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and
treasure (這並不是耗費大量鮮血和資金去解放福爾摩沙和澎湖的美國人民想看到的),
that the Cairo Declaration and this Government’s action in facilitating
Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a
menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering
which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;(開
羅宣言和「這個(美國)政府」允許中國人統治這些島嶼的結果，已經危及到東南亞的穩定
和安全，並且在過去四年裡讓福爾摩沙的人民受難)

        (5) Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn
to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the
past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on
the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative


        (6) Confronted with further deterioration rather than improvement and
with the likelihood that the strife and misery on the Chinese mainland will
spread to Formosa and the Pescadores, this Government can no longer in good


        (7) In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its
willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the
concerned powers regarding (a) the occupation and administration of the
islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and (b) the
future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed

10. Simultaneously, we should prepare with utmost despatch and vigor to lay
the groundwork for the meeting of the concerned powers. We should attempt to
obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese
regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands,
acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the
military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of
this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians,
Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces
available for the military operation.(多國共同出兵來進行這個軍事行動)

11. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in
providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their
case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts,
publications, … and other channels.…

12. At the meeting of the concerned powers, we should endeavor to insure that
the change-over on the islands be undertaken two weeks from the convocation
of the meeting. Details regarding the forthcoming operation should be decided
upon at the meeting. If China and the U.S.S.R. are represented at the
conference, it will be necessary to conduct the work of the conference
outside of the formal conference sessions which should then be devoted only
to forcing through agreed positions at the most rapid possible pace.

13. As soon as decisions to that effect are reached at the conference, we
should establish naval and air patrols designed to prevent access to the
islands from the mainland. At the same time, we should do everything possible
to facilitate the flight elsewhere of undesirable Chinese political and
military elements now on the islands, including ships to speed the exodus.(在


14. At this time, we should despatch an emissary to the key personality on
the island, General Sun Li-jen. Because Sun, of all the generals on the
island, has the least hopes on the mainland and is the most likely to resist
a change imposed from without, he is capable of performing the desperate act
of resisting vigorously. It would be judicious to present him with an
opportunity for saving his position. He should be offered the alternative of
declaring himself in favor of the Formosan cause and participating in the new
occupation. If he accepts, we shall have made a major military gain in
dividing the Chinese forces now on the island.(說拉攏孫立人然後可以得到現成的
軍隊在福爾摩沙島上，我晚點有空在翻譯這段)

15. The Generalissimo(大元帥，應該是說蔣介石) should be informed that if he
wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political
refugee.(如果他願意留在島上，他可以獲得政治難民身分)(美國對1945~1949年的中國來
台尋求庇護者都稱為"refugee"，意思為難民)



16. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we
should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should always remember
that our aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire
responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively
exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral
heavy-handed measures.

81 This memorandum, PPS 53, according to an attached chit, was canceled on

July 6; a note stated that the views of the Policy Planning Staff would be

submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in

Department of State files.

82 January 19, p. 270.

83 February 3, p. 281.

84 March 1, p. 290.

* “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff of the opinion that any overt
military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of
Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our military
strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake
the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might, particularly in
view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps have failed,
lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it
impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.” (NSC 37/3,
February 11, 1949.) [Footnote in the source text.]

85 National Military Establishment.

86 See Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington,

Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 307; see also post, pp. 1365 ff.

87 Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.

＋ As used in this paper “the powers which defeated Japan” and “the powers

at war with Japan” refer only to those represented on the Far Eastern

Commission: US, UK, USSR, China, Philippines, Australia, Canada, India, New

Zealand, Netherlands, France—plus Pakistan and Burma. [Footnote in the

source text.]

88 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, 1053.



韓戰救了蔣介石，卻殺了福爾摩沙



這種「仇恨和對立」就是黨國中華民國挑起的阿，二戰後來台躲避戰亂的人就類似現在敘
利亞躲到歐洲的難民一樣，求的只是安身立命並融入當地社會





1956/2/25中華民國美援會會議紀錄

王蓬說：關於小型民營工業貸款計畫，本人特別聲明，這完全是美方主張辦的，我方並不
願意而又不能不辦的。



本人站在工業委員會召集人的立場，認為上面講的理由實在欠通：




2.美方認為工業委員會是由大陸來的人所主持的，審核小工業貸款時，不免要偏袒大陸方
面人士。

(這紀錄收藏於近史所，不然《保衛大台灣的美援》書中也有)

從這些解密文件可以看到，美國當年對黨國中華民國的要求，都是為台灣人民著想






引用自《『馬關條約一百年一台灣命運的回顧與展望』國際學術研討會所發表的論文》
(米糖出口經濟是日治時代奠基的)



很好笑吧，黨國中華民國到1960年代和至少之後幾年都還讓台灣人過著比日治時代更窮困
的生活，憑什麼做一堆那種假的電視劇？真不要臉

黨國中華民國一直到1960年都還在仰賴日治時代奠基的米糖出口經濟，不是說自己發展台
灣經濟多行？



(這篇看誰可以幫我把小屋連結放上ptt有人轉貼的討論串，他們說想看原文，我這裡有原
文)

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